This paper evaluates IMF-led neoliberal restructuring in post-crisis Korea. The main conclusions are: the economic rebound in 1999-2000 was both incomplete and unsustainable; restructuring created a ongoing credit crunch that continues to constrain investment spending; Korea may have been pushed onto a long-term low-investment, low-growth trajectory; insecurity and inequality have risen substantially; and the influence of foreign capital has dramatically increased. The paper concludes by suggesting that Koreans should reject radical neoliberal restructuring and consider instead reforms to democratize and modernize their traditional state-guided growth model.
I Introduction 1
From 1961 through 1996, Korea's version of the East Asian state-led growth model achieved what some believe to be the greatest development success in history.
Real GDP growth averaged 8% a year, while real wages rose at annual rate of 7%. Many
Western economists admired the efficiency of the Korean model. For example, Stanley Fischer, until recently First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, wrote in 1996 that "there really has been a miracle in East Asia," adding that the view that government action was central to this success is "widely shared" (1996, pp. 345 and 347) . However, in the decade preceding 1997, under external pressure from G7 governments and foreign firms and banks who wanted to share in the Korean 'miracle,' and internal pressure from the large family-owned conglomerates known as chaebol and wealthy individuals who wanted freedom from government restraint, the state ended its traditional control of chaebol investment decisions, substantially reduced its regulation of domestic financial markets, and, critically, liberalized short-term capital flows. Chang and Evans argue that "the dismantling of the development state was effectively finished by … 1995" (1999, p. 
29).
This ill-advised liberalization led to a rapid inflow of short-term foreign bank loans. Foreign short-term credit, which stood at $12 billion in 1993, rose to $32 billion in 1994, $47 billion in 1995, and $67 billion in 1996. These funds helped fuel an overheated investment-led boom and created serious financial stress in the economy. In 1997, after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, foreign banks demanded immediate repayment of their loans. Illiquid Korean banks and highly leveraged Korean firms were unable to comply. Pushed to the verge of default, the Korea government accepted an 3 IMF loan to repay the foreign debt incurred by its banks and nonfinancial corporations.
In return, the IMF took control of the Korean economy.
Though the external crisis that brought the IMF to Korea was caused by the deconstruction of the traditional model, not its inherent flaws, the model was suddenly declared to be non-reformable in principle. 2 The IMF therefore began the process of replacing it with the only economic model said to be viable in the new era --a lightly regulated, globally integrated, free market economy. The IMF had an enthusiastic partner in President-elect Kim Dae Jung. In a 1985 book titled Mass-Participatory Economy: a Democratic Alternative for Korea, he stated that "maximum reliance on the market is the operating principle of my program" and that "world integration is our historic mission" (1985, pp. 78 and 34) . "I believe that the crisis will be remembered as a blessing," Kim announced in 1999, "because it is forcing essential economic changes" (New York Times, Feb. 18, 1999) .
Neoliberal restructuring would have failed to restore security and prosperity to the majority of Koreans no matter how it was implemented. In the post World War II era, no developing country has ever experienced long-term, widely shared growth based through the adoption of a neoliberal model. policy generated the sudden appearance of a large "reserve army of unemployed" which debilitated the labor movement, while the crisis and collapse frightened much of the m class, making it politically feasible to proceed with restructuring. Many middle class
Koreans were in favor of a continuation of the pre-crisis liberalization process from which they had personally profited, but they did not support economic collapse or a radical neoliberal revolution. Since the new policies had to be implemented while economic conditions kept political resistance weak, Korea ended up with a 'big-bang' rather than a gradual version of neoliberal restructuring.
iddle
The Korean economy rebounded from its 1998 collapse faster than expected. In mid 2000, supporters of neoliberalism declared Korea's recovery a new 'miracle.'
However, as we demonstrate below, four years of restructuring have created an economic disaster. The extent of this disaster was magnified by the economically dysfunctional but 6 politically expedient mode of implementation of neoliberal reforms.
II. A Brief Macro Economic Overview of Korea Under Restructuring
The combination of financial crisis and austerity macro policy followed by radical restructuring caused a precipitous drop in economic activity in 1998. Finally, neither investment nor consumption is likely to continue the rapid growth shown in 1999 and 2000. Investment growth is constrained by low profits, a credit crunch, and sluggish exports. Consumption spending has recently been rising more rapidly than disposable income, but only because of an explosion of household debt (discussed below).
There are obvious limits to, and potential financial dangers associated with, sustained debtfueled consumption spending. 
Restructuring Labor
President-elect Kim was determined to erode the domestic market power of large chaebol firms through massive foreign investment, which would not take place unless
Korea's militant unions were tamed. Breaking the strength of the labor movement thus became a central policy goal. Capital-labor conflict over the flexibility issue was at a temporary standoff after the successful general strike of January 1997. This changed dramatically in early 1998 as austerity policy quickly created rapidly rising unemployment.
With labor badly weakened, the IMF demanded that the government immediately repeal the traditional labor laws protecting job security, as its agreement with Korea specified.
New capital-friendly labor laws were enacted in February 1998. For the first time in modern Korean history, firms were allowed to fire as many workers as they pleased in cases declared to be of "urgent managerial need" (which included foreign takeovers), and temporary help agencies were legalized.
Prior to the crisis, Korea was the only OECD country with over 40% of those who worked for a non-family member in the insecure and poorly treated status called non- 
Restructuring Financial Markets
The government's objectives were to drive weak financial institutions from the market, clean up the large volume of non-performing loans (NPLs) generated primarily by its own macro policies in early 1998, recapitalize viable financial institutions, apply stronger prudential regulation to avoid excessive risk, assign one or two main creditor banks to monitor and control credit allocated to each important chaebol group, and induce foreign banks to take control of much of Korea's banking system in order to modernize its management techniques and raise its profitability.
After the severe economic collapse in 1998, all institutions involved in corporate lending were in desperate shape. The government was thus required to inject huge a of public money into the banking system. Public funds spent on financial restructur This forced banks to lower credit even further in an attempt to raise capital adequacy to mandated levels. The disastrous results of these policies were inevitable and thus foreseeable. As World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz put it: "If, in the midst of a downturn, we push banks too quickly toward 'prudent' capital adequacy ratios, we risk shutting down the flow of credit entirely" (in Kumar and Debroy, 1999, p.16) . 
Restructuring Nonfinancial Corporations
The Kim government announced five principles of corporate restructuring whos stated purpose was to break the traditional dominance of the large chaebol conglomerates, introduce more competitive pressure on chaebol firms, and raise productive efficiency and profitability. They were: a drastic and immediate reduction of corporate leverage; improved transparency; the end of cross-debt guarantees by conglomerate firms; chaebol concentration on core businesses; and, in an attempt to weaken founding-family control, greater managerial accountability to minority shareholders. The chaebol founding families had supported the brutal military dictatorship that ruled Korea for three decades and were virulently anti-labor. Thus, President Kim's attack on the chaebol was extremely popular.
By virtue of the public monies it injected into the financial system after 1997, the government controlled the main creditor banks for each large chaebol and was thus in position to attempt to force structural change on them. e 0 Government policy had only modest success in reducing corporate debt burdens.
The highly leveraged top 30 chaebol did reduce their average debt-equity ratio. However, most of the decline came about because the denominator rose, through new stock issues, asset sales, and asset revaluations. Whereas debt fell by 26% in the two years following the onset of crisis in December 1997, the value of equity rose by 125%. In 2000, the top 3 chaebol had debts of 265 trillion won, significantly less than in 1997, but more in nom terms than in 1995 and only slightly less than in 1996. An examination of the broad nonfinancial corporate sector shows that total debt in 2000 was 23% higher than in 1996, and less than 4% lower than in the peak year of 1997. An IMF study of a sample of 452 large firms showed even worse debt-reduction results, found no improvement in the maturity structure of corporate debt, and reported a deterioration in corporate liquidity since the crisis (IMF 2002, pp. 87-88) . Foreign interests now control six of the nine largest commercial banks. This is especially dangerous because Korea had a bank-based system of corporat s, with all major commercial and industrial firms dependent on bank loans for the investment capital. Since Korea's businesses are still heavily in debt, foreign control over key financial institutions gives foreign interests a stranglehold on Korea's future economic development. The current drive to shift bank credit flows from industry to high income households, (starving the business sector of badly needed investment funds in the process), has been led by foreign owned banks. This is only one example of the economic damage they can do.
IV Conclusions
hat neoliberal restructuring failed to improve economic prospects for the Korean people is hardly a surprise. It has failed to deliver a better life for the majority of citizens 
